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The Philosopher's Writing Hand 
Potocki's Manuscrit trouvée à Saragosse 
and the Spectre
Here alone, I, in books form’d of metals, 
Have written the secrets of wisdom, 
The secrets of dark contemplation, 
By fightings and conflicts dire 
With terrible monsters Sin-bred 
Which the bosoms of all inhabit, 
Seven Deadly Sins of the soul.
William Blake, The First Book of Urizen
1.
Potocki’s Manuscrit, like Sterne’s Tristram Shandy, or James Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake, examines the consistency and meaning of logos. This 
overwhelming philosophical task may seem surprisingly distant from 
a frivolously literary nature of the cited works, but it is precisely this 
paradox which is the first step towards opening the gates of the texts: 
we see their philosophical significance by struggling with the 
manifestly, if not arrogantly, literary character of the work. Literature 
vis-a-vis philosophy is like a cry or sigh with regard to the articulated 
speech: it points and indicates without naming. It calls and summons 
rather than instructs and pontificates. In brief, it is, as Blake would 
say in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, “of the body”, of the body in 
whose dark cavity or abyss resonates the voice of the soul liberated 
from the constraints of didacticism usually attached to soul’s
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pronouncements delivered “from above”. Thus, literature speaks 
from before philosophy, not because it merely chronologically 
precedes it, but because it goes beyond and below it; literature 
embraces philosophy. Thinking which chooses literature for its home 
is both more sublime and carnal than thinking which feeds on and of 
philosophy. Like Kant’s Erhaberte, thinking which reverberates in 
literature presents “unboundedness”, what we will never find the 
adequate form for, although, at the same time, the sign character of 
literature imposes upon a desire and necessity of a form. Thinking in 
and through literature, the example of which we have in Potocki’s 
Manuscrit, is of the imaginative, rather than the operational, type: 
“(...) our imagination, even in its greatest effort to do what is 
demanded of it and comprehend a given object in a whole of intuition 
(...), proves its own limits and inadequacy, and yet at the same time 
proves its vocation to obey a law, namely, to make itself adequate to 
that idea”.1
1 I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987), pp. 98,115.
2.
The order of literature is not that of philosophy. In the same way as 
the spectral world of the supernatural, either in its true horrifying 
(ir)reality or as a mock heroic theater of the human intrigue, haunts 
the house in which resides knowledge, literature intervenes in the 
discourse of philosophy. The general scenario of this intervention 
has been described by Jacques Derrida in his studies of the 
repeatableness of the sign which is an irreducible double of the truth 
which philosophy always wanted to see as unique and single. It is this 
secret and secretive, morganatic marriage of the truth and the sign 
bonded in and by writing which constitutes the romance of the 
Western episteme. When Derrida relates literature and philosophy 
the consequence of which is an impressive and painstaking effort at 
reading the history of philosophy as a history of several important 
metaphors, this is understandable as a turn towards and reenactment 
of the Romantic concept of correspondences which allow us both to 
reassert the differential character of things and see the connectedness 
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as the vehicle not only of ontological but also of ethical character. 
Derrida’s main correspondence is that between the head and the 
hand, i.e., between the concept and the sign. In later work, this bond 
replenishes as hospitality which establishes a link between the host 
and the invited and uninvited, hospitality as a welcoming acceptance 
(along the trail blazed by Nietzsche’s version of amor fati) of that- 
which-comes, even - or primarily - when it comes uninvited.
3.
The theory of correspondence which energizes the Romantic thought 
and whose tenets we find in Swedenborg, Emerson, and Blake has 
the ethical edge since it is not a technical device allowing for linking 
distant objects and phenomena but an ethical push which makes us 
responsible for our own attitude and action towards distant objects. 
Thus, when in correspondence with the world, I myself become a 
distant partner, an absent addressee of a thing as a message on its 
way towards me. We accentuate the fact that the thing as a missive is 
underway because, in fact, it will always remain such, it will never be 
handed in to me because it is only as a distant party that I come into 
play in the game of correspondence. In this scheme of the exchange of 
messages I function as a distant and absent body and not as the ever­
present soul. I - as a being which is a missive as well - also find myself 
on the way on which (as it frequently happens to letters) I am 
frequently intercepted by other parties, what is more, I am on the 
way the trajectory of which makes me more distant from the 
destination, and thus prevents the missive sent to “me” from reaching 
the addressee. The body is inspired by the fact that it is on the road, 
the epiphany revealed not only to Jack Kerouac but also to Nietzsche 
who, in Ecce homo, bans the souls from the play of inspired ideas: 
Der Leib is begeistert: lassen wir die ‘Seele’ aus dem Spiele,2 and who 
considers Sitzfleisch a sin against the Holy Ghost.3 A trip through the 
Sierra Morena, as well as so many other vagrancies described in 
various subplots of Manuscrit, is not only a case of the literary 
2 F. Nietzsche, Ecce homo, in F. Nietzsche, IFer/ce in Drei Bänden (Köln: Köneman, 
1994), v. 3, p. 463.
3 Ibid., p. 408.
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picaresque but, first of all, a rejection of the stability and canniness 
ascribed to the academic philosophical discourse. When van Worden 
travels through the wild landscape, he enters the territory where one 
abandons the inner sanctum of the established society for which les 
philosophes of the 18th century were dreaming a dream of 
perfectibility of man who, as Dr. Johnson puts it, “is softened” by 
civilization. Dr. Johnson’s analysis of the highlands of Scotland finds 
it completion in Potocki’s characterization of the Sierra Morena as 
uncivilized and “habitée par des contrabandiers, des bandits et 
quelques Bohémiens qui passaient pour manger les voyagers”.4 
Whereas Dr. Johnson ultimately finds retirement in the sophistication 
of urbanity and its philosophical debates leading to decisive 
conclusions, Potocki and his protagonist remain in the domain of 
vagrancy and undecidedness.
4 J. Potocki, La duchesse d’Avila (Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse) (Paris: Gallimard, 
1958), p. 49. All quotations will come from this edition.
4.
The two narratives - the Gothic semi-articulate discourse of the 
spectre which invades our world in order to demonstrate the vanity 
of the human law, and the imperial speech of the king-philosopher 
whose ambition is to regulate everything, even that which (like the 
morganatic marriage) constitutes a violation of the letter of the law - 
weave the main thread of Potocki’s Manuscrit. On day eleventh, which 
the company spends at the cabbalist’s castle, Uzeda tells us two stories 
which indicate the basic polarity of the book. In the first one a 
dramatic event in the life of Menippus of Lycea offers a romantic 
background of the amorous infatuation for the intervention of the 
philosopher whose glance penetrates the veil of illusion. The other 
narrative presents the philosopher as the only champion of the 
rational which challenges the raging and hegemonic reign of the 
demonic supernatural. In both stories the philosopher, Apollonius 
and Athenagore respectively, remains in a particular relationship or 
correspondence with the other. In the former narrative the 
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philosopher turns up as the one who sees what shuns and deludes the 
sight of others (“O beau jeune homme, vous caressez un serpent et 
un serpent vous caresse”, p. 189), in the latter he is the one who 
responds to the call of the ultimately other by following it not blindly 
however but “with the light” (“Il se leve, prend la lumière et suit le 
phantôme”, p. 192). The philosopher is one who yields the light; 
nevertheless, the philosophical luminescence does not serve to 
disclaim the existence of the non-rational but just the opposite - it 
exposes its force and impact upon man’s world. When the philosopher 
approaches us with his/her candle, its shimmering light gives off even 
more shade than brightness.
5.
We cannot fail to notice, however, that the power of the philosopher 
is linked with the authority of the word. Apollonius disperses the veil 
of illusive prosperity with “a few words” (“Mais, aux paroles que 
prononça Apollonius, la vaisselle d’or et d’argent disparut”, p. 190), 
and the scene in which the force of the logoi is demonstrated is 
preceded by a characteristic reference to the book as the substitute of 
reality: when asked whether they saw Tantalus’ gardens which “are 
and are not” the wedding guests answer that they “saw them in 
Homer because they never descended to hell” (“Nous les avons vus 
dans Homer, car nous ne sommes point descendus aux enfers”, 
p. 189). Two things may be said about this question and response. 
First, that the philosopher makes his point by turning towards what 
has been already told or written down (the story of Tantalus and his 
cruel punishment was an irreducible part of the Greek lore); hence, 
philosophy approaches vital problems of being via a detour of 
literature or narration as if the word of philosophy had to borrow its 
weight from the word of a tale. Second, in a significant act of a 
decision the audience respond not by saying that they “read” about 
Tantalus’ gardens in Homer, but that they “saw” them in the works 
of this author, indicating through this collusion of sensual order the 
fact that the force of the word of the tale - which makes it such a 
desirable help for philosophy - resides in its ability to call things into 
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being. The listeners’ response is doubly intriguing because not only 
do they testify to the creative/evocative power of the word of the tale, 
but also ascribe to it an even more powerful energy of presencing 
what does not exist. The word of the tale makes us see things which 
“are and are not”; it is at the origin of a certain illusion, but when 
philosophy wants to perforate the bubble of pretence, it takes 
recourse precisely to the word of the tale which now acquires a 
different power: it quotes itself, re-cites its own example, shows the 
secret of its machinery to expose the trick. The problem however 
remains: the trick of the word of the tale can be compromised by 
another trick of the same word. The machinery of Potocki’s text 
belongs to the same branch of textual technology which has produced 
Sterne’s masterpiece. In the first volume of Tristram Shandy we learn 
that the work is energized by two operations seemingly at variance 
with each other. One movement denies the other but the act of 
negation is also a pact of reconciliation which, without cancelling the 
original polemical contrariness of both motions, makes the text move 
on. Sterne himself renders it in the following way: “By this contrivance 
the machinery of my work is of a species by itself; two contrary 
motions are introduced into it, and reconciled, which were thought to 
be at variance with each other. In a word, my work is digressive, and 
it is progressive too, - and at the same time”.5 In William Blake’s 
terms, we are stepping on the territory where the difference between 
the negation and the contrary is meditated on. In the famous passage 
from the 40th plate of Milton we read in the appropriately Gothic 
rhetoric the basic tenets of Western thinking which oscillates between 
the “Reasoning Power” of regulatory, operational thought on the one 
hand and inspirational dictate of imagination on the other: “There is 
a Negation, & there is a Contrary: I the Negation must be destroyed 
to redeem the Contraries. I The Negation is the Spectre, the 
Reasoning Power in Man: I This is a false Body, an Incrustation over 
my Immortal / Spirit, a Selfhood which must be put off & annihilated 
alway” (11. 32-36). The magical art which has perfected the use of 
these tricks of digression and progression, which negotiates its way 
between the “Negation” and the “Contrary”, is called philosophy.
5 L. Sterne, The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, G. Petrie, ed. (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1967), p. 95.
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6.
Philosophy repels the spectral with the apotropaic force (which in 
Manuscrit is frequently a “farce”) of literature. We could say of Potocki 
what a critic says of Derrida that “the counterviolence he wished to 
oppose to Western thought was related to the study of literature”.6 
Athenagore extends this use of the word over writing: écriture becomes 
a weapon against what does not exist and only pretends to be, what “is 
and is not”, i.e., against itself. Left alone at night in the abandoned 
haunted house the philosopher must resist the anarchic play of 
imagination, and the way to do it is by writing: “Lui, craignant que son 
imagination trop libre n’aille, au gré d’une crainte frivole, se figurer 
de vaines fantômes, applique son esprit, ses yeux et sa main à écrire” 
(p. 192). Writing is clearly an exorcism but not so much against 
supernatural apparitions as against one’s own imagination; by writing I 
hold in check not only the work of my imagination but also desire and 
fear. With a pen in hand I can desist the intrusion which threatens me 
from the inside rather than from the outside; the danger of imagination 
originates in its not being able to resist the frivolity and vanity of the 
desire which tends towards strong effects, i.e., towards terror. It is this 
combination of liking (gré), a suspected lightness (frivole), and fear 
(crainte) which constitutes a true danger which the philosopher must 
be aware of. In other words, imagination exposes us to a serious peril 
because instead of writing fear it experiences it; imagination - as 
“illiterate” - is a subversive and unruly citizen of the republic of the 
human subject.
6 A. Bass, “The Double Game: An Introduction”, in J. Smith, W. Kerrigan, eds., Taking 
Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis, and Literature (Baltimore and London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 68.
7.
Thus, on the one hand, we can claim that writing turns its sharp edge 
against fear, but, on the other hand, we must observe that one who 
writes does it precisely out of fear. Athenagore looks for a pen 
alarmed, craignant, and anxiety seems to be unavoidable. It is only 
from within terror that écriture wants to repel it. Already terrified, 
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we grasp a pen in order not to fall victim to radical trepidation. 
Anxiety rules over philosopher who is the one who initiates a crusade 
against the terrifying. The repetitiveness of fear is not incidental, it is 
not merely a loss of nerve that is at stake here. Rather, Athenagore’s 
entrapment in the enchanted circle of alarm from which he starts and 
to which he returns focuses our attention upon the sublime. If 
Edmund Burke is right in his claim that the sublime is the most 
powerful emotion we can feel and its source is traceable to terror, 
then the philosopher’s reaction (in fear he writes in order to scare 
away fear) is both a denial and approval of the sublime. To put it 
differently, philosophy, particularly its enlightened version, wanted 
to do away with or to marginalize the sublime, but the discourse of 
philosophy is where the sublime returns in a spectral form. Repelling 
the sublime by the rejection of a fearful play of imagination, the 
philosopher invites it by his confession that he writes out of and in 
fear (craignant). When Burke writes “whatever is fitted in any sort to 
excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any 
sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a 
manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is 
productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of 
feeling”,7 the reader of Potocki’s Manuscrit wants to supplement this 
claim by saying that by attempting to tame fear the philosopher 
conceives of the yet stronger emotion. Philosophy wishes to discover, 
by writing, the sublimated sublime, the over-sublime. Athenagore, 
the only man who can brave the ghost, is a parodic version of the 
Übermensch of the Über-sublime, or Über-Erhabene.
7 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful (London, 1812), p. 58.
8.
The philosopher, Potocki tells us, is one who follows the ghost with a 
lamp (prend la lumière et suit le fantôme), and this lamp which is far 
from dispersing darkness is the same flame which illuminates pages 
of the philosopher’s writing. Moving into the haunted house, 
Athenagore prepares to front the spectre by ordering a bed, a lamp, 
The Philosopher’s Writing Hand... 25
and pads which will carry his writing (“Il se loge dans la maison, et 
sur le soir il ordonne qu’on lui dresse sons lit (...), qu’on lui apporte 
ses tablettes et de la lumière (...)”, p. 191). The philosopher burns 
the midnight oil because he/she needs this light to struggle with the 
spectres which he/she inadvertently calls in. Not only do we see it in 
Faust, but already in Milton’s “11 Penseroso” where the philosopher’s 
lamp is seen “at midnight hour” illuminating his solitary discourse 
with “thrice great Hermes” and debates with “daemons that are 
found I In fire, air, flood, or under ground”. Yet the hand is as 
important as the flame. When the spectre approaches accompanied 
by the jarring noise of rattling chains, the philosopher opposes to this 
cacophony two things: the scratching of a writing pen, and attention 
concentrated upon the very act of writing. Borrowing from Milton’s 
“Hymn on the Morning of Christ’s Nativity” we could say that the 
“horrid clang” of “old Dragon under ground” is counteracted by the 
“angelic symphony” and “silver chime” of écriture.
9.
The task of the philosopher is loyalty to one’s hand and pen. It is this 
probity and devotion to the hand that comes into play in the moment 
of the ultimate test. As we learn from Potocki, when the ghost 
approaches the philosopher’s study, he does not abandon the pen, 
but more forcefully turns his attention inside: “Il ne lève point 
les yeux, il ne quitte point sa plume, se rassure et s’efforce, pour 
ainsi dire, de ne point entendre” (p. 192). When faced by the “old 
Dragon” from “under ground” the philosopher does not raise his 
eyes and holds on to his pen which strategies are meant to strengthen 
the focus of his attentive glance upon himself. The theatrics of 
attentiveness are meaningful; meditative assiduity demonstrates itself 
by the three attachments: to oneself (de ne point entendre), to the 
studious look at the page (il ne lève point les yeux), and to the pen (il 
ne quitte point sa plume). Writing belongs then to a repertory of 
gestures which, like a careful glance upon a page and introspective 
sight, repels the spectre by ignoring it, by not noticing it, by not paying 
attention or, rather, by merciless exhausting one’s attentiveness upon 
something else so that the ghost cannot find any place in my attention.
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If writing is to function as an exorcism, it must be performed in a 
meditative mood which makes it exempt from the approaches of panic 
and fear. This is an idealistic principle since, as we have noticed, the 
writer begins his work already invaded by anxiety; thus, écriture is a 
domain in which one ghost repels and exorcises another because only 
as already haunted by a spectre do I have a chance to successfully act 
as an exorcist.
10.
The play of hands does not end so quickly. In fact, Potocki sketches 
three different gestures and positions. First, there is the initial 
position of the philosopher who never puts his pen aside and whose 
fingers are collected around the writing tool. Second, there is the 
spectre’s hand which, and we may have easily let this go unnoticed, is 
not free but remains bound by chains. The spectral and demonic 
comes with a fettered hand to signal a desire to threaten and annoy 
(the acoustic aspect of chains) as well as a wish to be delivered from 
oppression. When the ghost meets the philosopher, Potocki tells us, 
the bound met the free, the enslaved wants to summon the attention 
of the liberated. The phantom beckons Athenagore with his finger - 
“Le spectre était debout et l’appelait du doigt” (p. 192). The parodie 
effect of the scene relies upon this contrast: on the one hand, there is 
all the seriousness of imprisonment the reasons of which we know 
and will know nothing of. The existential guilt which defies rational 
explanation, the sign of Cain which Potocki meditates upon in his 
extended version of the Jew Eternal Wanderer, the character which 
rambles through the pages of Romantic literature beginning with 
C.F.D. Schubart’s 1783 Der ewige Jude. We read that the spectre’s 
walk is slow under the weight of chains: “Le fantôme marchait d’un 
pas lent, comme si le poids des chaînes l’eut accablé” (p. 192). On 
the other hand, the frivolousness of the bent finger (du doigt) which 
beckons the philosopher in the semi-intimate, semi-seductive gesture 
the lightness and vanity of which stands in direct opposition to the 
arm locked in heavy fetters.
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11.
The gesture of the finger compromises the spectre but also points at 
it seductive powers: when deprived of speech, when denied the grace 
of articulation, the ghost can only waver between the threat and 
seduction. The man of the world, like chevalier van Worden, responds 
to the latter, and hence the importance of the spectral eroticism so 
evident on the pages of the Manuscrit. The eroticism of spectres which 
unobservedly metamorphoses into the sphere of the dream as if to 
confirm and emphasize the fact that ghosts are already well 
established within us. We need to carefully note the chronology of 
spectral appearances. While at midnight the philosopher, a pen in 
hand, stubbornly focuses his eyes upon his writing pad to scare away 
the phantom, the man of the world despite the lugubrious sound of 
the midnight bell (“son tintement me semblait avoir quelque chose 
de lugubre”, p. 56) opens his arms in order to embrace. What the 
philosopher refuses to see (we have to remember that he “does not 
raise his eyes”) is the seductivity of the spectral to which he/she wants 
to remain immune. Van Worden, who is a negation of the 
philosopher, enjoys eroticism and seduction but, at the same time, is 
aware of its potentially spectral character. While the philosopher 
remains deaf to the call of the spectrally erotic, van Worden begins by 
responding to its impact remembering, however, its inherent dangers. 
A sophisticated sartorial phantasy of the Day First episode (“Le 
corset richement brodé en perle (...), Leurs bras nus étaient ornés 
de bracelets (...)”, p. 56) designs the elaborate scheme of confusion - 
one is placed on the threshold separating, but in the extremely 
ineffective manner, the spectral and the real, the material and the 
immaterial. Spectrality of eroticism in which literature relishes 
depends upon this oscillation between the polarities: what begins as a 
mere show of the power of darkness turns into a social occasion but 
inadvertently the latter can also be turned into the former. Thus, 
what begins as lugubrious turns out to be almost innocent and 
certainly inviting (“la porte de la chambre s’ouvrit, et je vis entrer 
une figure toutes noire, mais non pas effrayant, car c’était une belle 
négresse demi-nude”, p. 56); but what promises merely an infernal 
temptation shifts into a distinctly physical pleasure “(...) l’esprit de 
ténèbres (...) cherchait à me faire succomber par l’amour de l’or. 
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Mais les deux beautés se rapprochèrent de moi, et il me semblait 
bien que je touchais des corps et non pas des esprits”, p. 67). Van 
Worden’s position is echoed in Finnegan’s plight at the beginning of 
chapter VI of Joyce’s oeuvre in which Finnegan, besieged by two girls, 
remains (like van Worden) suspended in the aporetic world of the 
twilight zone between dream and waking consciousness, death and 
life; “the besieged bedreamt him stil and solely of those lililiths 
undeveiled which had undone him, gone for age, and knew not the 
watchful treachers at his wake, and theirs to stay”.8 The anxiety of 
Potocki’s protagonist over the identity of the seductive females, their 
mysterious and terrifying ability to be, at the same time, exciting and 
repelling forms the core of Finnegan’s concern: “besieged” referring 
to harsh reality is however modified by “bedreamt” which in one word 
combines the dream with the acted out erotic phantasy (“bed”). The 
feminine is both domesticated through a reduction to its either 
childcaring function or effeminacy of being and radicalized through 
its diabolical powers (“lililiths” which refers simultaneously to the 
demonic Ewig Weibliche of Lilith as well as to a sing-song lullaby 
quality - “lili” and a pseudo-talk used by adults with regard to children). 
Like Emina and Zibelda, the women are both teachers and deceivers 
(“treachers”), mistresses of knowledge and deception, of doing and 
un-doing (“undone him”), and their negligee belongs as much to the 
repertory of the theatre of the erotic as to the cosmic drama of the 
ultimate unconcealment of the devilish force. Both Finnegan and van 
Worden are “besieged” by the phantomatic which in an instant (one 
could speak then about the insta-phanto-matic) oscillates between the 
devilish seduction of transparent veiling and the seaming counteraction 
which tries to de-demonize the seductive (in the ninth chapter of 
Finnegans Wake we read about “a fammished devil”9 which refers both 
to the proximity of the satanic and the feminine and to the ascetic 
element of control and rejection of such a temptation: the devil is both 
“famished” and “femm¿e/ished”), to reduce it to the human dimension 
of nakedness which ambition, however, when achieved only reconfirms 
the phantomatic character of the power in question (the women are 
“undeveiled”: a complex portmanteau word which speaks of the devil 
8 J. Joyce, Finnegans Wake (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 75.
9 Ibid., p. 251.
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who energizes the feminine but also of an attempt to reduce Satan’s 
potential - the women are un-deveiled, i.e., removed from the influence 
of dark forces. “Undeveiling” also focuses upon the oscillation between 
veiling and unveiling but the ultimate result of the process remains in 
the state of Sternian “fertile confusion”, since the double negation of 
the “de-” and “un-” leaves us in a state of undecision). Several episodes 
in Manuscrit featuring crossdressing extend this state of indecision over 
the question of the ego which now is shown as transcending the strict 
borders of genders, the situation which Joyce fronts with the line “I is 
a femaline person”.10
10 Ibid., p. 251.
12.
Philosophy intuits and shuns the erotic in the spectral as the phantom 
defies the force of definition and prevents us from even determining 
and naming the ghostly; literature, which narrates the adventures of 
van Worden (we may muse over the etymology of the name which 
designates our chevalier to be a “man of words”), senses the spectral 
in the erotic as a play and dance (see the accomplished dancing 
performance in Day First) of fluid forms. Athenagore, as if he were a 
distant disciple of Strauss, considers scepticism, not faith, the task of 
the philosopher. It is not incidental that the stories take place in 
ancient Greece, as in the domain of philosophy Athens triumph over 
Jerusalem the loyalty to which is the war cry of van Worden. When his 
beautiful and seductive cousins want him to part with the necklace 
containing fragments of the Holy Cross, van Worden reiterates his 
staunch creed of loyalty: “J’ai promis à ma mère de ne le point quitter 
et je tiens mes promesses” (p. 136).
Yet the hand does not leave our field of observation. The 
philosopher repels the seduction by nervously holding on to his pen; 
van Worden holds cups and bodies. In the dream closing Day First 
the erotic phantasy of des sérails d’Afrique presents everything which 
the philosopher wants to repress and avoid by not abandoning his 
pen. The hand clutching the writing instrument wants to follow 
thinking rather than the ghost, to work amidst permanent forms 
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rather than among the metamorphic, changing flow of douces 
alternatives. What is more, the philosopher lights his lamp (which must 
be compared against the semi-nude negresse’s flambeau) and nervously 
scribbles on his writing pad in order not to fall asleep. A betrayal of the 
hand, the relaxation of the grip upon the pen would mean succumbing 
to the oneiric domain which changes the logic of philosophy into the 
logic of desire. The hand no longer serves as a writing machine but 
now is a device of embrace (“Je me sentais rêver, et j’avais cependent 
la conscience de ne point embrasser des songes”, p. 69); the thought is 
no longer related to the human hand but in the process of de-volution 
of the dangerous, spectral regress is reduced to the bird’s wing - in his 
dream van Worden’s thoughts travel to the seraglios of Africa and 
their delights on the wings of desire: “ma pensée, emportée sur l’aile 
des désirs, malgré moi, me plaçait au milieu des sérails d’Afrique (...)” 
(p. 69). One should carefully weigh the two words - malgré mor, the 
flying thought of desire, which in its regressive flight does not fear the 
spectrally erotic, eventually will result in a dramatic reduction and 
diminishing of the subject. This is precisely what the philosopher 
desperately wants to avoid by introspectively turning upon himself. 
Nothing should happen to the philosopher, the man of writing as 
opposed to the man of words, beyond, despite, or even against his will 
and decision. It is not surprising then that the philosopher does not 
ultimately give in to the seductive beckoning of the finger but to the 
discordant noise of dangling shackles. He responds only after the 
spectre rattles his chains again: “Le spectre recommence son fracas 
avec ses chaînes (...)” (p. 192).
13.
We cannot shake the philosopher’s hand and leave him to his writing 
pads yet. In act two of the drama of writing which demonstrates its 
apotropaic force against the spectre, the philosopher raises the hand 
but not in order to establish a communicative link with the phantom; 
the writer makes a sign with his hand to impose his time, the time of 
écriture, upon the supernatural guest. He raises his hand to make the 
spectre wait and, more importantly, to gain more time for more 
writing. Potocki writes: “Athénagore lui fait signe de la main de 
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l’attendre un peu et continue à écrire comme si de rien n’était” 
(p. 192). The philosopher has monopolized writing in order to, at 
least for a short while, dictate his own conditions to the world, to 
freeze possible interventions and criticisms. The stretched out hand 
of a writing philosopher is a gesture of withholding and stopping that 
which is approaching to disturb the philosopher’s peace by severely 
criticising his work, passing judgment on his écriture. Thus, the spectre 
which appears to the philosopher in Potocki’s story is the apparition 
of a critic who, if we follow the ironic lead of Shaftesbury, counts 
among “dreadful spectres, the giants, the enchanters, who traverse 
and disturb them [writers, T.S.] in their work”.11 As we learn from 
Shaftesbury’s “Advice to an Author” we can project the image of the 
hand and see it transform into the figure of the preface or dedication 
which, extends itself outside the main body of the text and thus 
protruded acts as the apotropaic gesture repelling critics. Here is 
Shaftesbury: “To judge indeed of the circumstances of a modern 
author by the pattern of his prefaces, dedications, and introductions, 
one would think that at the moment when a piece of his was in hand, 
some conjuration was forming against him, some diabolical powers 
drawing together to blast his work and cross his generous design. He 
therefore rouses his indignation, hardens his forehead, and with many 
furious defiances and Avaunt-Satans!’ enters on his business (...)”.12 
To write a preface is to extend an arm, a pen in hand, to discourage, 
but also at the same time to demonize, criticism which is now turned, 
as any hegemonic power does with its opponents, into “some 
diabolical powers”.
11 Shaftesbury, Characteristics, J. Robertson, ed. (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs 
and Merrill, 1964), p. 150.
12 Ibid., p. 151.
Writing wants primarily to continue to keep its own hold upon reality, 
and this desire to go on scribbling is so strong that it wishes to ignore 
everything that does not belong to its realm; even when the ghost has 
already arrived the philosopher continues writing as if nothing happened, 
“as if nothing was there”. It is this negligence of “nothing” which is 
characteristic of écriture. We must read Potocki’s phrase comme si de 
rien n’était literally: “nothing” (rien) has, in fact, (im)materialized, 
“nothing” has come to front the philosopher both visually and 
32 Tadeusz Sławek
acoustically, and through the force of writing the philosopher chooses to 
ignore it, instead of scrutinizing the extraordinary revelation he remains 
immersed in his own text thus betraying a true vocation of thinking which 
struggles with and harks back to the call of the powerful No (das 
machtende Nein, as Nietzsche names it) of nothing. The glance of the 
philosopher does not practice violence, does not vehemently repel or 
ostracize but, as if it were a species of etherizing Gorgon, turns the 
opponent into an immaterial, transparent apparition and moves on as if 
“there was nothing” at its end.13
13 For a description of such a look the reader may consult J.L. Marion’s, Dieu 
sans l’être. Hors-texte (Paris: Fayard, 1982).
14.
While literature passionately embraces the (im)material phantomatic 
body (“Emina me remercia de ma docilité et m’embrassa d’un air 
fort tendre. Ensuite Zibeddé colla sa bouche sur la mienne (...)”, 
p. 68), philosophy, metaphorically and literally, turns it back upon 
the spectral. It does not want to see the sign given by the phantom 
and accept its invitation. Potocki clearly indicates the topography of 
the scene: the philosopher sits at the table, bent over the writing pad, 
with his back towards the door at which there stands the spectre. We 
read that the philosopher “turned round” (se retourne), and only then 
did he see the beckoning sign of the ghost repetitively summoning 
him with the finger (on l’appelle du doigt encore une fois). As the final 
episode of the story demonstrates, philosophy’s reluctance towards 
the phantomatic is indicative of its tentativeness and abstention from 
undertaking saving efforts. Writing is what distances man from a 
danger, what introduces spacing between me and the other who is 
always a form of a risk and peril; the hand holding a pen cannot, at 
the same time, act as a saving hand.
15.
Spacing, one of the factors which make repetitiveness of the sign 
possible, introduces an interval which interrupts the continuity of sign 
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production. Without this intervention of blankness no articulation 
would be conceivable, and thus nothing could be brought to the court 
of reason without the white which is what makes one sign function as 
a witness of the appearance of another. A matrimonial rhetoric of 
the romance could hold that spacing is where the white marriage 
between signs takes place, i.e., where signs are set next to each other 
and yet keep the distance which allows them to preserve their 
independence. To remain within the reach of our reigning metaphor 
we could say that signs organize themselves, help one another to 
arrange themselves in some order out of fear of the spectre of the 
non-sign, of the dead sign which has arisen from the dead in a white 
shroud, a most typically spectral garment. Hence, Potocki’s Manuscrit 
as a book in which ghosts and apparitions feature prominently must 
necessarily center on spacing, i.e., on the white realm of interruption.
16.
Manuscrit invites us to a series of displacements which, on the one 
hand, blind us to the text as a certain purposeful whole, but, on the 
other hand, emphasize its visibility as a sequence of discontinuous 
narratives. Potocki’s work is an accelerator which spills a literary 
whole into atoms of tales, and thus verges on the border over which 
order looks straight into the abyss of chaos, which is yet another name 
of the spectre, or of the revenants, brigands, contrabandistes who 
appear in the very first paragraph of the text. We also have to 
remember that chaos is another name of a monster or infernal ghost: 
“Suspense, unboundedness, indeterminacy: one of their abiding 
images is the monster, and one of their abiding myths, Chaos”.14 As 
we move on in a geographic and textual trip over the mountains of 
Sierra Morena we feel more and more disconnected from the 
tradition of teleology of the text and hermeneutics as the art of 
exposing the objects and intentions of the word. That the manuscript 
itself is found in a detached house on a side, peripheral street 
(“m’étant avancé vers un lieu un peu écarté”, p. 47) suggests that 
14 W. Kerrigan, “Atoms Again: The Deaths of Individualism”, in Taking Chances..., 
p. 86.
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its fate is bound with detours and circuitous wanderings. Velasquez’s 
complaint in the Day XXVIII episode that he does not know who 
actually is speaking and who is listening leads us straight to a 
topographic metaphor of a labyrinth. When Velasquez, a pedantic 
and properly absent-minded mathematician and philosopher, places 
himself in a narrative maze, he echoes Lawrence Sterne’s reader’s 
anxious response to a situation of one lost in a desert of digressions. 
Having explained to the annoyed reader that Tristram Shandy “is a 
history-book of what passes in man’s own mind”, Sterne goes on to 
claim that it is precisely the “confusion” which is the central point of 
this history and thus that the scientific and scholarly machinery of 
causes and effects will be ruled out from his text: “Now you must 
understand that not one of these was the true cause of the confusion 
in my uncle Toby’s discourse; and it is for that very reason I enlarge 
upon them so long, after the manner of great physiologists - to shew 
the world what it did not arise from”.15 The metaphor of the labyrinth 
is thus crucial for, at least, two reasons. First, it delays, if not cancels, 
the idea of the center and destination; second, it imposes both upon 
the teller and listener the duty of re-starting, re-initiating, thus 
questioning the very idea of beginning which, to fill its semantic 
mission, must be single. In Sterne’s terminology, the text becomes 
“a fertile source of obscurity”. Joyce echoes with Finnegan, the builder 
of the tower of stories, “one thousand and one stories, all told” high, 
which however always collapses burying the listeners but also 
enforcing the necessity of a new (re)construction in a manner which 
parallels the resurrection of a dismembered god, “a rouseruction of 
his bogey”.16
15 L. Sterne, The Life and Opinions. pp. 107-108.
16 J. Joyce, Finnegans Wake..., pp. 5, 499.
17.
A story which does not begin or end but weaves itself on in the 
continuous process of telling reflects the motif of the travel which 
(dis)organizes Manuscrit. Thus, such a story, deprived of the 
sheltering solicitude of the end, bereft of the inn of ending, betrays 
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the principle of hospitality. The reader is not protected by the 
conclusive ending, does not find reassurance in the finality of telling, 
but is being surprised, astonished by sudden interventions of other 
voices and disturbing presences. Potocki begins by sketching a 
sublime landscape in which man cannot seek hospitality: “Le voyager 
qui se hasardait dans cette sauvage contrée s’y trouvait (...) assailli 
par mille terreurs capables de glacer les plus hardis courages. Il 
entendait des voix lamentables se mêler au bruit des torrents at aux 
sifflements de la tempête, des lueurs trompeuses l’égaraient, et des 
mains invisibles le poussaient vers des abîmes sans fond” (p. 49). 
This is a land where residence is, as we have learned, impossible, and 
auberges isolées have either been abandoned or turned into places 
where hospitality has been supplanted by hostile operations of the 
spectral. The movement from Day First to Day Second establishes 
the pattern of the book: it is a text on the broken promise of 
hospitality which subsumes both the disappointed curiosity of the 
reader who is prevented from reaching the inn of the conclusion and 
suppressed philosophical belief in the solidity of the meaning of signs 
and things. The moment in which van Worden wakes up and finds 
himself not in the auberge but between the corpses of the Zoto 
brothers at the foot of the gallows is a moment of crisis of the 
reliability of thinking: one can no longer rely upon the continuity of 
one’s relationship with things of and in space. What was one thing in 
the evening turns out to be another in the morning, forcing us to face 
two possibilities: either things and spatial locations are bereft of solid 
positioning, or the human subject is not a continuous one, changes 
from moment to moment, and does not preserve the memory of what 
is happening to him/her in between two moments. As Derrida says 
concerning Stirner, “this Ego, this living individual would itself be 
inhabited and invaded by its own specter. It would be constituted by 
specters which it becomes the host and which it assembles in the 
haunted community of a single body. Ego = ghost. Therefore T am’ 
would mean T am haunted’; I am haunted by myself who am (haunted 
by myself who am haunted by myself who am ... and so forth)”.17
17 J. Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the И-brk of Mourning, and the New 
International, trans. P. Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), p. 133.
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18.
Hence, the polarity of Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse is that between 
the uncertain and vague positions which cannot be properly mapped; 
spanned between the (re)beginning and (never)ending, with both 
notions thus under erasure, the text neither begins nor ends leaving 
us in a state of indecision and intellectual confusion. A fragment from 
the final section of Day Fifth will provide us with a good example of 
this strategy. “Comme Zoto en était à cet endroit de l’histoire de son 
père, un de ses frères vint lui dire qu’on demandait des ordres au 
sujet de l’embarquement. Il nous quitta donc, en nous demandant la 
permission de reprendre le lendemain le fil de son récit. Mais ce qu’il 
avait dit me donnait beacoup à penser. Il n’avait cessé de vanter 
l’honneur, la délicatesse, l’exacte probité de gens à qui l’on aurait fait 
grâce de les pendre. Eabus de ces mots, dont il se servait avec tant de 
confiance, brouillait toutes mes idées” (p. 119). When the story is 
about to end, it is suspended, and thus an ending becomes no more 
than a promise of a new beginning which, in turn, will not be new as it 
will merely hark back to what has already “ended”. As we read in the 
text, the thread of the narrative will not be started but only “retaken” 
(re-prendre). The teller of the tale departs but even this parting is not 
quite “final” since we know that he will return the next day 
(lendemain) and, what is more, his parting itself is implicated in 
another act of departure; Zoto parts in order to part, but this double 
parting is not more but less decisive as we know that he will come 
back only to promise yet another act of departure (at the end of Day 
Sixth he interrupts his tale again promising to continue “tomorrow”, 
“demain”, p. 135). The tale is always “to be continued” which informs 
us of the priority of the series and sequence over the completed 
whole.
19.
In fact, the very frame of Manuscrit implies a whole series of deferring 
gestures as if tales which constitute the book were subject to the 
postal principle “as differential-deferring relay that regularly 
prevents, delays, dispatches the deposition of the thesis, that
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prohibits all repose and incessantly deposes, deports and keeps the 
movement of speculation on the run”.18 First, the narrator cannot, in 
fact, read the text which only whets his curiosity by particular words 
the narrator can understand: “c’était un manuscrit en espagnol; je ne 
connaissais que fort peu cette langue, mais, cependant, j’en savais 
assez pour comprendre que ce livre pouvait être amusant: on y parlait 
de brigands, de revenants, de cabalistes (...)” (p. 47). We only know 
that the text which we are just about to be told was no more than a 
promise of an unusual story (roman bizarre), and that it remained a 
closed book to the narrator who had to withhold his interest and 
suspend its fulfilment till some later moment. The second deferral is 
thus due to the necessity of translation (je le priais de me traduire cet 
ouvrage en français), and the third results from the inevitable 
transition from the aural to the written (Je l’e'crivis sous sa dictée).
18 J. Derrida, La carte postale (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), p. 61.
The story belongs to the order of patience whereas the quotidian 
has the irresistible urgency that cannot be put off or pacified. The 
story is interrupted by everyday life concerns which signals that the 
tale-telling must always withdraw before what cannot be delayed and 
postponed. Interrupting his narrative on Day Sixth Zoto says: “Je 
suis obligé de vous quitter, le gouvernement de ma caverne exige 
des soins attentifs auxquels je ne puis me refuser” (p. 135). One 
abandons the story because one is called by the politics of the 
everyday, by the gouvernement de ma caverne, and this appeal is so 
strong that it cannot be resisted (je ne puis me refuser). The narrative 
gives in to the ethical obligation of attentive care, soins attentifs, which 
speak with the overwhelming and irresistible force. The story remains 
unfinished for two reasons: first, it capitulates to the larger order of 
the day which very clearly does not recognize the importance of the 
narrative and whose order is different from the order of the tale; 
second, the tale suspended so that we could pay our dues to the 
everyday now turns out to be a troublesome gift as it shakes the very 
foundations of the quotidian. By interrupting the story we 
demonstrate both solicitude and criticism towards the world. The 
narrative is a giving force which must temporarily suspend its 
operations in order to create space and time in which the gift will 
start working. In fine, it is a force which gives food to our thought (ce 
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qu’il avait dit me donnait beacoup à penser) as a subversive, 
destabilizing agency. Having listened to the now interrupted narrative 
of Zoto van Worden’s ideas are “dimmed” (brouillait toutes mes idées), 
and his notions of virtue and justice become much less absolute 
(“J’avouais ne pouvoir refuser une sorte d’estime à des hommes aussi 
courageux que ceux qu’il me dépeignait”, p. 136).
20.
If thinking owes its subversive force to interruptions and hindrances 
the movement of which causes the ground of ideas to shake, the 
ambition of absolute hegemony, of one who wants to claim total 
power over me, will be to reintroduce the order of continuity. Tyranny 
defies discontinuity as it can always turn itself into a hiding place, a 
subterraneous residence of revolt and anarchy. The caverns of gypsies 
in Potocki’s text are such extended versions of the fissures in the 
structure of the text which dislocate its center. Nowhere is the 
emphasis placed by the absolutist on continuity more striking than in 
the grotesque fragment of Giulio Romati’s narrative dealing with the 
princess de Monte-Salerno. The phantom lady whose purpose is to 
seduce the young man with the intimidating show of opulence and 
beauty begins to tell her story on condition of not being interrupted. 
When Giulio reacts with surprised Qui? vous, Madame? to her 
introducing herself as a daughter of the last prince of Monte Salerno, 
the spectre replies with an angry reminder of her sovereignity: “Je 
voulais dire la Princesse de Mont-Salerno. Mais ne m’interrompez 
plus” (p. 220). The spectral, as any hegemonic system, does not wish 
to be interrupted because such a spacing can disclose and compromise 
the repertory of tactical moves which secure the position of the 
master. The humble and innocent question asked by Romati 
disconcerts the spectre because it bares its self-imposed identity, 
shows - in a very telling form “I wanted to say”,je voulais dire, which 
rhetorically unconceals what the phantom is mentally desperately 
unwilling to reveal - the vanity of the subject position. It is not a 
coincidence that, on the one hand, Romati’s questions touch upon 
the nature of the princess’ identity and that, on the other hand, her 
responses show a growing dislike of being interrupted. The more 
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exposed to hindrances the hegemonic agency is, the more it is likely 
to lose its power. Thus, when asked to confirm that her servant girls 
were made to obey all her desires, the spectre responds with “Je vous 
avais prié de ne point m’interrompre”, which she ejects with obvious 
annoyance - “reprit-elle avec un peu d’humeur” (p. 221). The 
phrase is repeated at least once more in the tale and at one point it is 
transformed in a straightforward act of censorship. When Romati 
calls her life a “paradise on earth”, the apparition responds with a 
staunch ban: “Romati, je vous avais prié de ne plus vous servir de 
cette expression” (p. 224). The discontinuous, the cavernous, the 
subterraneous which belongs to the nomadic tribe of gypsies is also 
what opposes the censoring power of the continuous and hegemonic 
the purpose and function of which is to “teach us a lesson” (“Romati, 
rappelez-vous toute votre vie de ce que vous avez vu ici”, p. 225) 
and tatoo us with the traces of its might (“Je relevais ma manche, et 
je vis effectivement mon bras tout brûlé et les marques des cinq doigts 
de la Princesse”, p. 226).
Tadeusz Sławek
Pisząca ręka filozofa
Rękopis znaleziony w Saragossie Potockiego i sprawa widma 
Streszczenie
Autor podejmuje próbę odczytania dzieła Potockiego jako dialogu między narracją 
a dyskursem filozoficznym. Podobnie jak w Sterne’owskim Tristramie Shandy mechanizm 
tekstu Potockiego polega na stałym napięciu między przymusem posuwania narracji 
naprzód, a jednoczesnym jej wstrzymywaniem przez liczne dygresje i labiryntowe zwroty 
opowieści układających się w strukturę „szkatułkową”. Filozofia poświęca swoje wysiłki 
nazywaniu, porządkowaniu, definiowaniu rzeczywistości; literatura w swym wymiarze 
narracyjnym staje się terenem działania wyobraźni, która zajmuje się tym, co definiowaniu 
wymyka się, a zatem temu, co prowadzi egzystencję widmową, co jest w porównaniu 
z jasnymi i pełnymi bytami filozofii jedynie duchem i cieniem. Stąd zainteresowanie 
literatury nie tylko motywami gotyckimi, lecz także pustą przestrzenią, spacją oddzielającą, 
przerywającą ciąg słów tworzących narrację. Stąd też nagle zatrzymania historii 
opowiadanych przez Potockiego i niedokończony ich charakter jako opowieści 
pozbawionych pointy. Narracja Sterne’a i Potockiego swoim przerywanym, nieciągłym 
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tokiem staje się w ten sposób silą moderującą i korygującą nie tylko ambicje filozofii 
do wyrażenia „pełni” bytu, lecz także żywioł codziennego bytowania: gdy ten ostatni 
cechuje się niecierpliwością dążenia i osiągania celów, narracja jest szkołą cierpliwości 
jako cnoty etycznej.
Tadeusz Sławek
La main écrivante du philosophe
Manuscrit trouvé à Saragosse de Jean Potocki et le cas du fantôme
Résumé
Earticle est une tentative de lire l’oeuvre de Potocki comme un dialogue entre la 
narration et le discours philosophique. Comme dans Tristram Shandy de Sterne, le 
mécanisme du texte de Potocki consiste à maintenir une tension constante entre 
l’obligation de propulser la narration en avant et, parallèlement, la tendance à différer 
celle-ci par de nombreuses digressions et des retournements labyrinthiques des histoires 
qui forment une structure „à tiroirs”. La philosophie consacre ses efforts à nommer, à 
définir le réel; la littérature dans sa dimension narrative devient un champ d’action de 
l’imagination qui s’occupe de ce qui échappe à la définition et, partant, de ce qui mène 
une existence fantomatique, de ce qui, par rapport aux êtres distinctes et pleins de la 
philosophie n’est qu’un fantôme et une ombre. D’où l’intérêt que la littérature porte non 
seulement aux motifs gothiques, maïs aussi à l’espace vide, au blanc entre les lignes du 
texte qui interrompt la suite de mots constituant la narration. Telle est également la cause 
de brusques arrêts des histoires relatées par Potocki et leur caractère inachevé en tant que 
récits dépourvus de pointe. Par ses interruptions, par sa discontinuité, la narration de 
Sterne et de Potocki devient ainsi une force qui modère et corrige non seulement les 
ambitions de la philosophie laquelle vise à exprimer la „plénitude” de l’être, mais aussi 
l’existence quotidienne: si cette dernière se caractérise par une course impatiente vers la 
réalisation de ses objectifs, la narration est par contre une école de patience considérée 
comme une vertu éthique.
